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The business of chemistry takes very seriously
its responsibility to protect people and the
environment throughout the entire life cycle of
its products. This commitment is embodied in
the product stewardship aspects of Responsible
Care [American Chemistry Council (ACC)
2005a], the ACC’s initiative to continuously
improve its members’ environmental, health,
safety, and security performance, as well as the
Long-Range Research Initiative (ACC 2005b),
ACC’s voluntary initiative to fund research to
increase understanding of the potential
impacts chemicals may have on human health
and the environment. Support for both pro-
grams is a condition of ACC membership.
Also, a comprehensive set of U.S. and foreign
government rules strictly regulate how chemi-
cals are developed, manufactured, distributed,
and used. The chemical industry conducts
extensive research and testing on its products
to implement product stewardship commit-
ments and to ensure compliance with those
governmental requirements. This work is con-
ducted both directly by companies and indi-
rectly through contracts with and grants to
external scientists and research institutions.
Consequently, the products of chemistry are
among the most thoroughly evaluated and
regulated in commerce. The research and test-
ing conducted by the chemical industry are
absolutely necessary, as they provide informa-
tion on the potential health and environmental
risks of substances that manufacturers, users,
and government agencies all rely on to deter-
mine the conditions under which chemical
products can be safely used.
In recent years some have questioned the
reliability and credibility of public health and
environmental research conducted or funded
by the chemical industry, suggesting that
industry research is fundamentally conﬂicted
and hence unreliable (Devine 2001; Sass et al.
2005). These critics also challenge the legiti-
macy of allowing scientists employed or
funded by industry to participate on scientiﬁc
review panels (Center for Science in the
Public Interest and Environmental Working
Group 2004; Devine 2001; Greer and
Steinzor 2002; Sass et al. 2005). Both con-
tentions are mistaken and counterproductive
to societal interests.
Chemical Industry Science
Scientiﬁc studies conducted or funded by the
chemical industry have long been acknowl-
edged by government agencies, nongovern-
mental organizations, and the scientific
community at large as necessary and valuable
contributions to the understanding of poten-
tial public health and environmental effects
related to the manufacture and use of chemi-
cals [Environmental Defense 1998; Health
and Environmental Sciences Institute 2005;
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) 2005d]. These same groups generally
also recognize that, historically and for the
foreseeable future, the costs associated with
conducting chemical product testing have
been and will be borne largely by industry,
not the public sector, reﬂecting both the free
enterprise view that those who benefit from
an activity should bear the costs of that activ-
ity as well, and chronic resource limitations
on the public sector.
A wide variety of mechanisms exists by
which policymakers and the public they serve
can assure themselves that studies performed
by or funded by industry are identified as
such, meet high scientiﬁc standards, and are
not suppressed when their ﬁndings are adverse
to industry’s interests. These practices and
standards include the following:
• The ability of test sponsors to contractually
authorize investigators—regardless of the
results—to submit the investigators’ ﬁndings
for publication in the peer-reviewed scien-
tific literature without sponsor approval.
This is the policy of ACC’s Long-Range
Research Initiative.
•The practice of Environmental Health
Perspectives and virtually all other scientiﬁc
journals to require disclosure of funding
sources.
• Peer review, which both government agen-
cies and private entities may conduct or
fund.
• The U.S. EPA requirement that all studies
required to be submitted in connection with
chemical regulation and pesticide statutes be
conducted in accordance with U.S. EPA-
approved guidelines for test protocols and
Good Laboratory Practice (GLP) regulations
(U.S. EPA 2005b, 2005c), which entail full
availability to government authorities of the
raw, quality-assured data ﬁles for review and
audit. Research required to be submitted to
regulatory agencies in member countries of
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) must also follow
OECD GLP principles (OECD 2005),
which serve to substantiate the high quality
and validity used for determining the safety
of chemicals and chemical products in those
countries.
• Information Quality Act (2000) guidelines
issued by all federal agencies. These guide-
lines require scientiﬁc data to meet applica-
ble standards for accuracy, reliability, and
lack of bias and that apply to privately gen-
erated information when agencies rely on 
it for regulatory purposes (Office of
Management and Budget 2002; U.S. EPA
2002a).
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pesticide regulatory statutes (Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
1972; Toxic Substances Control Act 1976),
and similar global equivalents, that chemical
manufacturers and pesticide registrants
provide the U.S. EPA and its equivalents
with timely notification of any adverse
effects ﬁndings.
• The prospect of tort liability for suppression
of adverse research ﬁndings.
• Finally, and most fundamentally, the scien-
tific process itself through which different
investigators attempt to reproduce the ﬁnd-
ings of others—a process that has led to the
retraction of papers for which results could
not be reproduced (McLachlan 1997).
The more a given study follows the above
practices and standards, the more conﬁdence
one can place in it. In particular, the use of
U.S. EPA-approved test protocols helps ensure
that high standards of quality are being fol-
lowed. Such protocols have been validated by
the U.S. EPA and chosen after extensive and
careful review to determine that the results
would provide reproducible information suit-
able for regulatory decision making. Use of
such protocols helps to produce a degree of
certainty regarding the reliability and relevance
of test results, which in turn provides the con-
ﬁdence necessary for making safety and regula-
tory determinations. Similarly, when research
studies adhere to GLPs, as is the norm for
industry health and environmental studies,
reviewers and those acting on the science may
have a high degree of confidence that the
experimenters adhered to the specific and
detailed experimental protocol employed, took
all of the steps and measurements claimed to
be taken during conduct of the study itself,
and accurately reported the test results
(Anderson et al. 2001).
No federal laws, rules, or policies express a
presumption that scientific work should be
ignored or given lesser weight because of the
source of its funding. To the contrary, an
entire body of federal law embodies a congres-
sional mandate that agencies allow interested
or affected parties to provide information to
them and fairly consider that information.
Primary among these is the Administrative
Procedure Act (1946); others include 
the Information Quality Act (2000), the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (1972), the 
Federal Register Act (1935), the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (1980), and the Paperwork
Reduction Act (1980).
Ironically, the proliferation of articles and
presentations impugning the merits of indus-
try science is having the effect of subjecting
that science to much greater public and
agency scrutiny than is applied to science con-
ducted or funded by government or nonproﬁt
entities (Miller 2005). Such scrutiny can only
increase the likelihood that any flaws in the
work will be identiﬁed.
Ultimately, all scientific research must
stand or fall on its merits. Researchers should
disclose their sources of funding because in
cases where those sources have a potential
interest in a question addressed by the
research, others may want to scrutinize that
research with heightened care to determine the
extent to which it followed the practices and
standards discussed above. However, it is
unscientiﬁc (Society of Toxicology 1997), as
well as unfair, to disregard or discount a study
based solely on which investigator or institu-
tion conducted or funded it.
Chemical Industry Scientists
The chemical industry’s commitment to
scientific research and product testing
includes engaging the highest quality scien-
tists. Our scientists have national and interna-
tional stature in the scientiﬁc community, as
reﬂected by their inclusion on such authorita-
tive bodies as the National Academies’ Board
on Environmental Studies and Toxicology
(National Academies 2005) and the U.S. EPA
Science Advisory Board (U.S. EPA 2005a).
These scientists have expert knowledge of the
chemicals their employers manufacture and
fully appreciate the value of their contribu-
tions—as objective, trained scientiﬁc experts—
to the development and interpretation of the
science needed to evaluate the health and envi-
ronmental effects of their products. As mem-
bers of professional associations such as the
Society of Toxicology, industry scientists
adhere to both personal and professional com-
mitments to act in accordance with the codes
of ethics of their professions (Society of
Toxicology 1985).
As noted above, some have argued that
scientists employed or funded partially by
industry should not be permitted to serve on
private or governmental review panels or sim-
ilar bodies due to an asserted conflict of
interest. Any discussion of this issue must
carefully distinguish between conflict of
interest and bias.
Federal rules issued under the Ethics in
Government Act (Office of Government
Ethics 1997) provide that true conflicts of
interest are limited to instances where a person
has a concrete ﬁnancial interest in the subject
being addressed. A conflict might occur, for
example, in the case of an employee of a busi-
ness that generates signiﬁcant revenues from a
product, if that employee is tapped to review a
government assessment of that product. A
conﬂict of interest could also occur in the case
of a “public interest” representative, particu-
larly if that representative is also serving as an
expert witness in connection with ongoing liti-
gation over the same subject matter. It is
important to note that these government
ethics rules still allow a person with a ﬁnancial
interest to serve where “the need for the indi-
vidual’s services outweighs the potential for a
conﬂict of interest.”
By contrast, bias (or “partiality,” under
government ethics rules) is both unavoidable
and unobjectionable. As the National
Academies explain, bias derives from
points of view or positions that are largely intellec-
tually motivated or that arise from the close identi-
ﬁcation or association of an individual with a point
of view of a particular group. (National Academies
2001) 
Similarly, a U.S. EPA Science Advisory
Board committee has stated that
[a]lthough it is possible to avoid conﬂict of interest,
avoidance of bias is probably not possible. All sci-
entists carry bias due, for example, to discipline,
afﬁliation and experience. (U.S. EPA 2000)
Fifteen past presidents of the Society of
Toxicology have written in Risk Policy Report
(2002) that
[o]f course, all scientists have biases; acknowledging
this, we as a society must be aware of those biases
and seek to ensure balance in the scientiﬁc panels
whose task is to provide the best possible technical
review of complex, important issues.
Finally, any evaluation of the role of indus-
try scientists in governmental processes must
consider the federal laws referenced above that
empower interested persons to have input into
those processes. Particularly relevant in this
context is the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(1972), which requires advisory committees to
be “balanced” and thus should prohibit both
exclusion of, as well as domination by, any
interest (Ofﬁce of Government Ethics 1997).
Expertise is the touchstone that guides the
procedures followed by both the National
Academies (2001) and the U.S. EPA Science
Advisory Board (U.S. EPA 2002b). The
National Academies’ current policy (National
Academies 2003) is a particularly useful and
appropriate statement of the relevant issues,
for the following reasons:
• It emphasizes that knowledge, training, and
experience are the foremost considerations
and that no one should be appointed to a
panel to represent a particular point of view
or special interest.
• It clarifies that “[f]or some studies . . . it
may be important to have an ‘industrial’
perspective or an ‘environmental’ perspec-
tive,” not because these “sides” need to be
represented, but 
because such individuals, through their partic-
ular knowledge and experience, are often vital
to achieving an informed, comprehensive, and
authoritative understanding and analysis of
the speciﬁc problems and potential solutions
to be considered by the committee.
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refers to “ﬁnancial interests” and that these
can arise from any quarter, including regu-
lated entities, the government, and private
organizations.
• It explains that biases should not be disquali-
fying—even when a person works for a
company with “a general business interest in”
the subject of the panel—unless the person
is totally committed to a particular point of
view and unwilling, or reasonably perceived to
be unwilling, to consider other perspectives or
relevant evidence to the contrary.
Such a case of bias would seem to be present
in the report of Sass et al. (2005), for exam-
ple, which argues that peer-review panels
involving industry scientists are not “scientiﬁ-
cally credible.” The article acknowledges
funding from the Beldon Fund, which
awarded the authors’ employer (the Natural
Resources Defense Council) a 3-year,
$210,000 grant
[t]o implement [Natural Resources Defense
Council’s] Public Interest Service Initiative, a
campaign to remove industry-funded scientists
from EPA advisory boards and to appoint sci-
entists dedicated to protecting human health
and the environment. (Beldon Fund 2001)
The Ofﬁce of Management and Budget’s
recent peer-review guidelines agree with the
National Academies and the U.S. EPA that
the most important factor in selecting reviewers is
expertise: ensuring that the selected reviewer has
the knowledge, experience and skills necessary to
perform the review. (Office of Management and
Budget 2005)
Consistent with these authoritative
sources, scientists employed or funded by
industry should be eligible to participate in
peer-review panels and similar bodies just like
any other scientists, based on the knowledge,
training, and experience they bring to the
body. All participants in such bodies should
disclose sources of potential biases and con-
ﬂicts. Potential biases should be considered in
seeking a balanced panel rather than being
used as a basis for disqualifying an expert.
True conﬂicts of interest generally do require
disqualification, except when outweighed by
the need for a person’s services.
Conclusion
The chemical industry takes seriously its 
central responsibility to conduct or fund
research and testing of chemicals for use in the
risk assessment processes. The scientiﬁc work it
conducts and funds has an important and
appropriate role in the development of health
and environmental information. Its scientists
can serve important and legitimate functions on
scientiﬁc advisory panels. Frequently, they can
provide unique knowledge and insight concern-
ing the chemical in question and therefore
should not be unjustifiably prevented from
contributing to the work of such panels.
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